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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
MALCOLM N. McKINNON, 
Plaintiff-A ppellant, 
Cross-Respondent, 
vs. 
T H E CORPORATION O F T H E 
P R E S I D E N T OF T H E C H U R C H 
O F J E S U S C H R I S T O F L A T T E R -
D A Y SAINTS, a corporation, 
Defendant-Respondent, 
Cross-Appellant. 
Case No. 
13553 
BRIEF OF CROSS-RESPONDENT 
S T A T E M E N T OF T H E N A T U R E 
OF T H E CASE 
Plaintiff-Appellant and Cross-Respondent seeks 
money damages against defendant-respondent and 
cross-appellant arising out of the latter's breach of legal 
duty to provide appellant and cross-respondent with a 
haulage right-of-way to reach his substantial coal hold-
ings in Emery County, Utah. 
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D I S P O S I T I O N I N T H E L O W E R COURT 
Respondent and cross-appellant moved the Third 
Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, Judge 
Ernest F . Baldwin, Jr. , for Summary Judgment on 
appellant's Complaint. At the hearing, appellant re-
quested leave to file an Amended Complaint and to add 
or substitute parties defendant. The trial court granted 
respondent and cross-appellant's motion for Summary 
Judgment on three enumerated bases and denied appel-
lant leave to amend his Complaint and to add or sub-
stitute parties. 
R E L I E F S O U G H T ON A P P E A L 
Appellant and cross-respondent seeks reversal of 
the trial court's final Amended Order dismissing his 
Complaint, denying appellant leave to file an Amended 
Complaint and to add to or substitute parties and prays 
that this Court order: 
1. That the case be remanded to the district court 
on its merits. 
2. That appellant and cross-respondent be per-
mitted to file his Amended Complaint, and alternative-
iy. 
3. That appellant and cross-respondent's motion to 
add or substitute parties be granted should this Court 
rule that the suit is now pending against the wrong de-
fendant. 
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Appellant and cross-respondent further seeks a de-
termination by this Court that defendant-respondent 
and cross-appellant's motion for Summary Judgment 
should be denied on the additional grounds that the 
existence of the contract between the parties has been 
established and the defense of Statute of Frauds is non-
apropos by virtue of a constructive trust imposed upon 
respondent and cross-appellant. 
S T A T E M E N T OF F A C T S 
The facts of this case have been adequately deline-
ated by appellant in his opening brief. 
A R G U M E N T ON CROSS-APPEAL 
POINT I. 
T H E E X I S T E N C E OF T H E CONTRACT BE-
T W E E N T H E P A R T I E S H A S B E E N E S T A B -
L I S H E D AS A M A T T E R OF F A C T AND L A W . 
In its cross-appeal respondent and cross-appellant, 
hereinafter for convenience referred to as "respondent," 
contends that the lower court erred in not granting its 
motion for Summary Judgment on the alternative 
grounds that there was no binding contract between the 
parties and that the contract failed to comply with the 
Utah Statute of Frauds; both of these arguments must 
fail as neither is supported either by the record or ap-
plicable law. 
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The factual background surrounding the creation 
of the contract between the parties has been fully de-
lineated in appellant's opening brief. In summary, ap-
pellant was initially contacted by Leonard Adams, the 
then General Manager of the coal mine properties of 
The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, here-
inafter referred to as the "Church," located in Carbon 
and Emery Counties who requested appellant to aban-
don a United States Government preference lease on 
640 acres adjacent to Church held property to allow the 
Church to acquire the lease upon public bid (McKinnon 
deposition pg. 7). After a series of meetings, it was 
agreed by the parties that appellant would abandon this 
lease right only on the specific condition that respondent 
grant appellant a right-of-way across Church held prop-
erties should such right-of-way be required for access 
around the end of the fault which existed in the area 
(McKinnon deposition, Exhibit 2). 
Appellant's counsel, Frank Armstrong, met with 
Henry D. Moyle, an Apostle of respondent, and at that 
time President Moyle and Mr. Armstrong effectuated 
a meeting of the minds and the contract came into exist-
ence (Armstrong deposition, pg. 9). The contract was 
not reduced to writing at the specific request of re-
spondent to avoid any possible claim that the actions of 
appellant in abandoning his lease right and agreeing to 
assist respondent in obtaining the lease amounted to col-
lusive bidding, which practice was expressly forbidden 
by federal law. At that time, President Moyle, as an 
authorized representative of respondent, expressly 
4 
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promised to Mr. Armstrong as counsel for appellant 
that the right-of-way would be given to appellant imme-
diately upon the respondent obtaining the lease in ques-
tion. 
Q. Do you recall if Mr. Moyle said anything 
specifically regarding waiting until some fu-
ture time to prepare the formal right-of-way 
agreement? 
A. Well, I don't recall. I t seems to me that I 
mentioned someone might claim there might 
be some collusion and he said, "That's right. 
We can't do that." He said, "We will wait 
until we get the lease and then we will pre-
pare a right-of-way for him." (Armstrong 
deposition, pg. 10) 
In its brief, respondent makes reference to several 
writings which it claims sustain its allegation that no 
contract was finalized. While appellant recognizes that 
interpretation of writings can lead to irreconcilable dif-
ferences of opinion, the writings set forth in respond-
ent's brief clearly show that a contract existed between 
appellant and respondent at sometime prior to January 
6, 1960, for the letter of Frank Armstrong to President 
Moyle of that date set forth on page 8 of respondent's 
brief states: 
I talked to you sometime ago just prior to the 
death of Leonard E. Adams regarding an ap-
pointment to meet with Brother Adams and 
Malcolm N. McKinnon to arrange the granting 
of a right-of-way to Mr. McKinnon over a por-
tion of the land the Church was obtaining by 
lease from the Federal Government and to ar-
5 
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range for a contribution to the Church out of 
money to be paid Mr. McKinnon for a portion 
of his mine. (McKinnon deposition, Exhibit 9) 
The writing speaks for itself: The right-of-way con-
tract had been entered into and a subsequent meeting 
was to be arranged to enumerate the specific portions of 
property to be covered in the agreement. The letter of 
appellant to President Moyle under date of February 
8, 1961, again clearly delineates the existence of the 
contract in the following language which is also cited by 
respondent on page 8 of its brief: 
While there is no immediate rush to conclude 
this matter, I have been holding a sizeable dona-
tion for the Church. I want to turn this over to 
you at the time you give me a letter stating that: 
In the event I would require additional land to 
make it possible to go around the end of the 
faults that might otherwise prevent me from be-
ing able to extract the coal from land lying west 
of the faults, the Church would agree to make it 
available. This is in accord with the understand-
ing you had with Mr. Armstrong. (Respondent's 
Exhibit "A", pg. 8) 
Appellant recognizes that it is this Court's prerogative 
to interpret the writings but a fair reading of the above-
quoted material indicates beyond doubt that an agree-
ment had already been reached between Armstrong 
and Moyle and that appellant was now simply request-
ing a winding up of the mechanical details to the grant 
of the right-of-way. 
Subsequently, sometime after February 8, 1961, 
Mr. Armstrong met with President Moyle and de-
6 
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livered the "sizeable donation," referred to above, in the 
form of two $7,000.00 checks and expressly instructed 
President Moyle that the checks should not be cashed 
"until this right-of-way was drawn up—the written 
right-of-way." (Armstrong deposition, pg. 11). 
Q. When these checks were presented to Presi-
dent Moyle, did he make any response? 
A. Yes. H e said, "Fine. We will hold these 
checks until we can give you the right-of-way 
and until we get the lease from the govern-
ment." (Armstrong deposition, pg. 13) 
President Moyle handed the two $7,000.00 checks to his 
assistant, Alfred W. Uhrhan, who placed them in an 
envelope and wrote in his own hand upon the face of the 
envelope: "Hold. Two checks totalling $14,000.00. 
Malcolm McKinnon tendered for right-of-way. This 
matter is pending." (McKinnon deposition, Exhibit 
12). 
On September 17, 1969, in a letter to appellant, 
Alfred W. Uhrhan explained what Uhrhan had meant 
by his notation on the face of the envelope: "The two 
checks were handed to me personally by the late Presi-
dent Moyle with the instruction to hold them until the 
details of the right-of-way were worked out with mine 
management." (McKinnon deposition, Exhibit 12). 
This statement from President Moyle's assistant is 
proof positive that the agreement existed as Frank 
Armstrong had delineated it. The only item in the con-
tract left for further clarification was the exact area to 
be affected by the right-of-way. Respondent had agreed 
7 
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to grant appellant the right-of-way "around the end of 
the fault" (Armstrong deposition, pg. 9) and neither 
party then knew the extent of the faulting. 
Appellant respectfully refers this Court to the ar-
guments set forth in appellant's opening brief regard-
ing the law in this matter. There was an agreement. The 
agreement was actively breached by respondent. No 
amount of legerdemain by respondent can obviate the 
fact that one of its highest three officials entered into a 
good faith agreement with appellant. Respondent ob-
tained the benefit of the bargain when it acquired a lease 
it had long sought as well as $14,000.00 from appellant. 
As the existence of the contract had been shown by un-
controverted evidence, respondent's first point on cross-
appeal must fail. 
P O I N T I I . 
T H E D E F E N S E O F S T A T U T E OF F R A U D S 
IS NON-APROPOS TO T H E FACTS A N D CIR-
CUMSTANCES OF T H I S CASE. 
Appellant has avered the existence of a construc-
tive trust upon the lease of the 640 acres obtained by re-
spondent under the agreement with appellant; the con-
structive trust arises by operation of law and, thus, the 
Statute of Frauds is non-apropos even though, as a mat-
ter of fact, sufficient writings are in existence to show 
the precise terms of the agreement. In his opening 
brief, appellant has set forth the relevant and material 
facts of this case which preclude the raising of the de-
8 
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fense of Statute of Frauds as a matter of law and this 
Court's attention is again respectfully directed to the 
argument therein contained. 
Appellant would further submit that this Court 
should deny respondent the efficacy of the Utah Statute 
of Frauds by reason of respondent's unconscionable and 
unjust conduct toward appellant. It is beyond cavil that 
a party can be estopped from invoking the benefits of 
technical defenses such as Statute of Frauds and that 
such defenses should not be applied in a way which 
would perpetrate rather than prevent fraud. This is 
especially true of Statute of Frauds. James Mack Com-
pany v. Bear River Milling Co., 63 Utah 565, 227 Pac. 
1033 (1924) ; Bracken v. Chadburn, 55 Utah 430, 185 
Pac. 1021 (1919). 
The equities in this case point out precisely the dif-
ficulties encountered by courts in dealing with the de-
fense of Statute of Frauds when the conduct of the 
party attempting to raise defense has been reproachful. 
This Court's attention is respectfully directed to a well 
written and thoroughly expositive article in the Utah 
Law Review entitled "An Appraisal of the Utah Stat-
ute of Frauds" found at 9 U L R at page 978 wherein 
the writer in reviewing such cases indicates that this 
Court has, without exception, denied the defense when-
ever the terms of the agreement were clear even though 
the rationale employed by the Court differed depending 
upon the facts of the particular case. See especially 9 
U L R page 982-989 and cases cited therein. 
9 
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A more recent case from this Court discussing the 
Statute of Frauds, although the decision ultimately 
granted defendant benefit of the defense based upon 
the peculiar facts of the case, is Easton v. Wycoff, 4 Ut. 
2d 386, 295 P.2d 332 (1956) wherein the Court recog-
nized the principle that reliance upon the promise of 
another to execute a writing in the future could 
estop the promisor to set up the Statute of Frauds as 
the defense to an action based upon contract. The Court 
cited precedent and authority including Williston on 
Contracts, I I , Sec. 533A at 4 Ut.2d 388: 
The doctrine of promissory estoppel has also 
been extended to permit recovery on the contract 
by one who has relied to his detriment on the 
promise of the defendant to execute and deliver 
a sufficient memorandum. 
This rationale is critical in our case because this is ex-
actly what respondent promised to do and then failed to 
perform. Thus, the unjust and unconscionable conduct 
of respondent gives rise to an estoppel and the Statute 
of Frauds is unavailable to it as a defense. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant respectfully submits that the argument 
herein as well as that found in appellant's opening brief 
require reversal of the lower court's determination and 
remand of this cause for trial on the merits. Substantial 
10 
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and material issues of fact must be resolved at trial. Re-
spondent is not entitled to its judgment as a matter of 
law. 
Respectfully submitted, 
K E I T H E. T A Y L O R 
LeROY S. A X L A N D 
of and for 
PARSONS, B E H L E & L A T I M E R 
79 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant, 
Cross-Respondent 
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